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BILATERALISM IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
DEFEATING THE WTO SYSTEM FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINES
Carlos M Correat
I. Introduction
The adoption of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)' was regarded by
developing countries as the end of a process of substantial strengthening of
intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection. They expected that, having
consented to high IPRs standards, they would be protected from unilateral
actions and further demands of increased levels of protection by rich
countries. They were wrong, however. Shortly after the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, the European Union and the United States continued to
use various means to put pressure on developing countries not only to
implement the TRIPS Agreement, but to obtain "TRIPS-plus" protection, that
is, levels of protection beyond the minimum standards required by the TRIPS
Agreement. Thus, the United States did not dismantle its controversial
Special Section 301 of the Trade Act,2 which empowers the United States
Trade Representative ("USTR") to initiate cases and retaliate even against
countries compliant with the TRIPS standards.3 Threatening the removal of
trade preferences or cutting development aid became common practice.
These pressures--epitomized by the case brought against South Africa 4 -
t Professor Carlos Correa is a Professor at the University of Buenos Aires and Director of
the project on Intellectual Property and Development, South Centre, Geneva.
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M.
1197 (1994).
2 A WTO panel examined, in a case initiated by the EC and their Member States, the
consistency with WTO obligations of the authorization given to the U.S. government to retaliate
under several provisions (such as "Special 301") of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (19
U.S.C § 2114c(2)(A)). The panel did not find - based on a commitment by the U.S. government
not to apply sanctions without WTO authorization - a violation of WTO obligations. See WTO
Panel Report on United States - Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R
(Dec. 22, 1999).
3 See the "Special 301" section of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. 19 U.S.C. §
2114c(2)(A)(1984).
4 See MARIE BYSTROM & PETER EINARSSON, TRIPS - CONSEQUENCES FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR SWEDISH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 36, 37 (2001), at
http://www.grain.org/docs/sida-trips-2001-en.pdf (a consultancy report to the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency).
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raised significant criticism from academic 5 and non-governmental
organizations 6 and developing countries, which eventually led to the
adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health ("Doha Declaration") 7 by the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference.
The Doha Declaration confirmed the flexibilities that the TRIPS Agreement
left Member countries to implement various obligations at the national
level.
The strategy to seek higher standards of IPRs through unilateral
pressures has been supplemented by an apparently less coactive, but
perhaps more effective, approach. TRIPS-plus obligations are extracted in
exchange for trade concessions made in the context of free trade
agreements. The European Communities practiced this approach in a
number of agreements entered with, among others, South Africa (1999),
Tunisia (1998), and the Palestinian Authority (1997), which required the
latter to ensure adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights "in conformity with the highest international standards." The United
States-which has become "the principal architect of the global regulatory
ratchet for intellectual property" 8-has concluded the negotiation of free
trade agreements (FTAs) including IPRs specific rules, with Jordan,
Singapore, Morocco, Chile and the Central American countries. 9 Trade
5 See, e.g. PETER DRAHOS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY STANDARD-SETTING 14-18 (2002), at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/
study_papers/sp8_drahosstudy.pdf (a study prepared for the United Kingdom Commission
on Intellectual Property Rights.
6 See, e.g., SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003).
7 Fourth Doha Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health].
8 Peter Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property's Empire: The Role of FTAs, GRAIN
(2003), at http://www.grain.org/rights/tripsplus.cfm?id=28.
9 The United States also applies Trade and Investment Framework Agreements ("TIFAs")
in order to promote the establishment of legal protections for investors, enhancement of
intellectual property protection, changes in customs procedures, and transparency in
government and commercial regulations. There are TIFAs in place in a number of countries,
including Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Yemen. See generally
U.S. Trade Representative, Middle East Free Trade Initiative: U.S. Regional Plan to Spur
Economic Growth (Mar. 2, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/
FactSheets/2004/MiddleEastFreeTrade_InitiativeU.S._RegionalPlan_toSpurEcono
mic_Growth.html; United States Department of State, Trade and Investment Framework
Agreements, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tpp/cl0333.htm; See, e.g. Agreement
Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations, June 18, 2002, U.S.-Bahr.,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Regional/MEFTA/asset upload_
file 168_3538.pdf.
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negotiations in course include the Southern African Customs Union,' °
Thailand," and three Andean countries (Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia).
FTAs would seem to have a strategic rather than an immediate
commercial objective for the United States. They reflect a reaction to the
growing resistance that United States initiatives encounter in the WTO.
Bilateral dealings permit the United States to obtain' 2 what it cannot easily
get multilaterally: "Presumably, US leverage is also greater in bilateral or
plurilateral negotiations than in larger forums where other major economic
powers are present."' 13  However, bilateral agreements reinforce the
multilateral process as well, as the FTAs oblige partners to adhere to IPRs
international conventions of U.S. choice, including UPOV (1991) and the
recent WIPO Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonogram Treaty
(1996). European FTAs also oblige their partners to adhere to a number of
international conventions. 14
Interestingly, the countries involved in bilateral negotiations with the
United States account for a minor share of U.S. exports.' 5  FTAs are
attractive to governments of developing countries as they may gain political
credit for greater access (generally for agricultural products, raw materials,
and low value added manufactures) to the large U.S. market. The less
tangible but equally or more important effects on development policies
appear as matters of secondary concern. Whatever the commercial gains of
FTAs in the short and long term for such countries may be, the dramatic
increase in the level of protection of IPRs is likely to have a direct and
10 The Southern African Customs Union includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South
Africa, and Swaziland.
"t Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., USTR Notifies Congress of Intent to
Initiate Free Trade Agreement Negotiations with Thailand (Feb. 12, 2004) available at
http://www.usa.or.th/relation/rel021204.htm.
12 Hearing to Review US. Trade Policy Objectives and Initiatives Before the
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 22 (Mar. 18,
1997) (statement of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 105_house_
hearings&docid=f:51072.pdf (stating that "we recognize that certain problems can only be
addressed effectively, and with a degree of specificity, on a bilateral basis."). See Jean-
Frddric Morin, Le droit international des brevets: entre le multilat~ralisme et le
bilatiralisme am&icain, 34 ttudes Internationales 537 (2003), available at
http://www.iisd.ca/whatsnew/usbilateralIPR.pdf.
13 Richard E. Feinberg, The Political Economy of United States' Free Trade
Arrangements, 26 WORLD. ECON. 1019, 1036 (2003).
14 See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature Nov. 27, 2000, Ice.-Liech.-Nor.-
Switz.-Mex., at http://www.sice.org/Trade/mexefta/mexeftal.asp.
15 For instance, Morocco accounts for .04 percent of U.S. exports and all Central
American countries account for 1.44 percent of U.S. exports. See Feinberg, supra note 13, at
1035.
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significant impact on the capacity to design and implement development
policies, particularly in the area of public health.
This paper elaborates on the bilateralism in IPRs standard setting,
using as an example the substantial elevation of IPRs standards in the
Central American Free Trade Agreement ("CAFTA") 16 in relation to
pharmaceutical test data (Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement) and the
new requirement (not present in the TRIPS Agreement) linking patent
protection to the registration of a pharmaceutical product. Though not
extensively treated by the literature, these issues are of key importance to
determine the degree of competition in the pharmaceutical market,
especially in countries that have introduced product patent protection only
recently. Enhanced protection of pharmaceuticals, as obtained by the
United States in CAFTA, may substantially limit competition and restrain
access to medicines, in direct contradiction with the objectives of the Doha
Declaration.
II. The TRIPS Standard on Data Protection
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement requires Members to protect test
data submitted for the marketing approval of pharmaceuticals and chemical
products for agriculture. Such data normally relate to the results of tests
about quality, safety, and efficacy of new compounds. Test data must be
protected if national authorities require its submission. Thus, if they rely on
an approval granted in a foreign country, the obligation does not apply. In
addition, Article 39.3 does not require protection be given to data that are
already publicly available, but to secret data. Protection is mandated only
for new chemical entities. Members have considerable discretion in
defining this concept, which excludes second indications, new
formulations, or dosage forms. Finally, in order to grant protection,
national regulatory authorities may request the applicant to prove that the
information for which protection is sought is the result of significant
investment.
In addition, Article 39.3 requires countries to protect test data against
"unfair commercial use." Protection is to be conferred against dishonest
commercial practices. A practice expressly required or permitted by the
law may not be deemed dishonest. Granting marketing approval to a
second entrant, based on the similarity with a previously approved product,
is not a proscribed "use" under Article 39.3.
Test data must be protected under the discipline of unfair competition,
as established in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
16 Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, Dom. Rep.-Central America-U.S., available at
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/BilateralUDR-CAFTA/DR-
CAFTA FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html.
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Property (Article l0bis) 17 and the TRIPS Agreement (Article 39.1). Under
such discipline, no exclusive rights are granted, but only the right to take
legal action against whomever has obtained a commercial advantage by
means of a dishonest practice. Obtaining a commercial advantage, as such,
is not condemnable under unfair competition rules.1 8 Legal protection only
arises when dishonest conduct has been used for that purpose.
A. Controversies on Interpretation
Despite the fact that Article 39.3 does not provide for the granting of
exclusive rights, governments of some developed countries have argued-
responding to strong industry lobbying-that protection of test data can
only be ensured if a minimum period (e.g. five years) of exclusivity is
granted. The manufacturer that developed test data, it is held, has invested
heavily, and deserves a fair return on investment. Where patent law fails to
provide protection (for example, because the patent on an active component
is to expire shortly, or because a product is based on a combination of
known substances used in a novel manner), unless data exclusivity is
granted, competitors would face no barrier to producing and registering an
exact copy of the product.
But this argument leads to the protection of investment as such, and
not of a creative or inventive outcome-the very purpose of intellectual
property rights. Furthermore, Article 39.3 does not mention at all an
obligation to grant exclusivity for test data. The granting of exclusivity
constitutes a drastic derogation to the principle of free competition, which
cannot be inferred from a text that does not provide for it. 19
The issue of data protection is especially relevant for off-patent
products as well as for products, such as biological, that are often difficult
to patent. In cases where the product is patented, the patent holder can, in
principle, exclude any commercial competition during the lifetime of the
patent-a period of exclusion which will generally run longer than that
afforded by data protections.
Data protection rules are particularly problematic for developing
countries that until recently did not provide patent protection for
pharmaceuticals and/or chemical products for agriculture,2° like in the case
17 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature Mar.
20, 1883, art. 1 Obis, at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm.
18 See, e.g., ANSELM KAMPERMAN SANDERS, UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: THE PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL CREATIVITY (1997).
19 See CARLOS M. CORREA, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR THE REGISTRATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS; IMPLEMENTING THE STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 50, (2002)
at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/protection/toc.htm.
20 See, e.g., Brook K. Baker, The Drug Registration Battlefield: US. Trade Policy Erects
New, Nearly Impenetrable Barriers to Lower-Cost Generic Medicines of Assured Quality,
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of most Latin American countries. Data exclusivity, if granted, may
become a substitute for patent protection for many products and nullify, in
practice, their right to keep in the public domain products for which patents
were not recognized under pre-TRIPS legislation.
B. National Experiences
The protection of test data was circumscribed to a few countries until
recently. The United States, Japan, and the European Communities
pioneered it, based on a sui generis system ("data exclusivity"). This
system applies to disclosed and undisclosed data as well21 and prevents
third parties from using the test data or relying on them in order to seek
marketing approval without the originator's consent. The exclusivity,
however, does not prevent a third party from developing its own data on the
same product. Under U.S. pressure, several countries have adopted this
approach (e.g. Australia) or have assumed obligations (e.g. Chile) to do so
under bilateral agreements. In Brazil, data exclusivity has been adopted
only in relation to veterinary and agricultural products (not for
pharmaceuticals), for a period of ten years for products consisting of new
chemical entities, and of five years for other products (Law No. 10.603
(17.12.03)).
In the Andean Community, a TRIPS-plus standard was adopted by
Decision 344 ("Common Regime on Industrial Property") in 1993, but
repealed in September 2000 by Decision 486.22 Under this Decision, the
Andean Community's countries must protect test data against unfair
commercial use without providing for exclusivity, in line with the TRIPS
standard. However, data exclusivity was recognized in Colombia for
pharmaceuticals in 2002 (Decree No. 2085).23
HEALTH GAP REPORT (Health Global Access Project, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 16, 2004,
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/dataexcI/baker02l62004.html; see Article 39.3
of the TRIPS Agreement: Its Genesis and Present Context, COMPLETED PROJECT (Indian
Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi, India), July 2003, available at
http://www.iift.edu/iift/wto/ptojcompleted.asp.
21 In fact, national health authorities such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
generally publish clinical trials and submit analytical data for marketing approval. See U.S.
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, BASIC QUEsTIONs AND ANSWERS ABOUT CLINICAL
TRIALS, available at http://www.fda.gov/oashi/clinicaltrials/clintrialdoc.html.
22 Decision 486: Common Intellectual Property Regime, entered into effect Dec. 1, 2000,
Andean Community, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/junac/decisiones/
DEC486e.asp#notet.
23 Ultimas Normas, Servicio de Salud Colombia, Sept. 19, 2002, available at
http://www.saludcolombia.com/actual/htmlnormas/Dec2085_02.htm.
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The U.S. government initiated a case under WTO rules complaining
about Argentina's alleged failure to appropriately protect test data. The
dispute was settled at the consultation stage after two years of discussions.24
Argentina did not accept the U.S. claim, maintained its law, and did not
grant data exclusivity. No further action has been taken by the United
States against Argentina, or any other country that does not recognize data
exclusivity in the framework of the WTO. However, the USTR has listed,
under the Special Section 301 of the Trade Act, a large number of countries
that, according to USTR, do not confer adequate (that is, exclusive)
protection for test data.
In sum, although the establishment of exclusive protection for test data
is not required under the TRIPS Agreement,25 it has been provided for in
developed countries and in bilateral or regional agreements involving some
developing countries. Such exclusivity operates like a substitute for patent
protection, thereby detracting from the public domain products that should
be freely available. The implications of this issue for public health and
agricultural production are significant.
111. TRIPS-plus in CAFTA
CAFTA was negotiated by the four Central American countries (Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua), and the Dominican Republic
will join this agreement. These countries are among the poorest in the
Americas, however, CAFTA has elevated the standards of intellectual
property protection as if they were in the ranks of the richest and most
developed countries. While CAFTA extends to Central America U.S. law
and practice, as mentioned below, it also introduces standards that exceed
current levels of protection in the United States.
A. Data Exclusivity
CAFTA significantly departs from the TRIPS Agreement in many
areas, particularly in those of interest to the pharmaceutical industry. Thus,
it obliges to extend the term of patent protection to compensate for delays
in patent examination and in the marketing approval of pharmaceutical
products. It also establishes a sui generis regime of "data exclusivity" for
the protection of test data submitted for registration of pharmaceuticals.
According to Article 15.10.1 (a) of CAFTA:
24 See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution According to the Conditions Set Forth in
the Agreement, June 20, 2002, IP/D/I1 8/Add. 1, IP/D/22/Add. 1, available at www.wto.org.
25 Lucas R. Arrivillaga, An International Standard of Protection for Test Data Submitted
to Authorities to Obtain Marketing Authorization for Drugs-TRIPS Article 39.3, 6 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 139,143 (2003).
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If a Party requires, as a condition of approving the marketing of a
new pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product, the
submission of undisclosed data concerning safety or efficacy, the
Party shall not permit third persons, without the consent of the
person who provided such information, to market a product on the
basis of (1) the information, or (2) the approval granted to the
person who submitted the information for at least five years for
pharmaceutical products and ten years for agricultural chemical
products from the date of approval in the Party.
Thus, if the original medicine is approved in a Central American
country, no approval to a generic company can be given during the
following five years from the date of approval of the original medicine in
that country, whether using the data submitted by the originator company or
relying on such approval. Despite the fact that, applications for registration
can languish for years,27 and that the company that originated the data has
no obligation to file for marketing approval within a limited deadline, the
five years period will be counted from the date of approval in the country
where the application was made.
CAFTA contemplates the situation in which a country allows
registration of a drug on the basis of the marketing approval obtained in
another country. Some developing countries have followed this model,
which squarely puts them outside the scope of Article 39.3 of the TRIPS
Agreement. Article 15.10.1 (b) of CAFTA provides the following:
If a Party permits, as a condition of approving the marketing of a new
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product, third persons to submit
evidence concerning the safety or efficacy of a product that was
previously approved in .another territory, such as evidence of prior
marketing approval, the Party shall not permit third persons, without the
consent of the person who previously obtained such approval in the other
territory, to obtain authorization or to market a product on the basis of (1)
evidence of prior marketing approval in the other territory, or (2)
information concerning safety or efficacy that was previously submitted
to obtain marketing approval in another territory, for at least five years for
pharmaceutical products and ten years for agricultural chemical products
from the date approval was granted in the Party's territory to the person
who received approval in the other territory. In order to receive protection
under this subparagraph, a Party may require that the person providing the
information in the other territory seek approval in the territory of the
Party within five years after obtaining marketing approval in the other
territory.2
8
26 Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, art. 15.10.1 (a).
27 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 20.
28 Free Trade Agreement, supra note 16, art. 15.10.1 (b).
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This paragraph prevents both the use of test data submitted to a foreign
authority as well as relying on the prior approval in a foreign country. The
five-year protection runs from the date of approval of the medicine by the
originator in the Party. A Party may require that the originator seek
approval within five years after obtaining marketing approval in the other
territory. If this requirement was established, the originator would enjoy a
full ten years period of protection during which no other party would be
able to use, without his consent, directly or indirectly, the relevant test data.
Due to poor wording, some questions arise in relation to this provision,
notably whether or not a competitor could request marketing approval
during the first five year period, in the absence of an application by the
originator, whether the national authority could approve the competitor's
product and if so, whether this authorization could subsist or would have to
be revoked when the originator finally obtains marketing approval in the
Party. This provision seems to give the originator company, by law, a lead-
time of at least five years over its competitors. Although the five year
period is counted from the date of the originator's approval, it is difficult to
interpret that before that date it would be possible for national authorities to
grant marketing approval to a third party without the consent of the
originator company. If this interpretation were correct, the net effect on
public health, as elaborated below, would be most disturbing.
1. New Chemical Entities
Member countries are bound to grant protection under Article 39.3 to
chemical entities that are "new," that is, molecules that were not previously
incorporated into a product approved for marketing in any country.
CAFTA, however, obliges the Parties to apply the concept of "new
chemical entities" with a broader meaning than required under the TRIPS
Agreement, not surprisingly in a manner that significantly favours the
interests of U.S. pharmaceutical companies. According to Article
15.10(1)(c) "new chemical entities" includes entities "not previously
approved" in the Party granting approval, without any time limit. Thus, a
chemical entity previously approved at any time in a foreign country will
continue to be "new" for a CAFTA Party until it is registered there, even if
this happens many years after its first marketing approval in the world.
In a footnote to the same Article it is clarified that "[w]here a Party, on
the date it implemented the TRIPS Agreement, had in place a system for
protecting pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products not involving
new chemical entities from unfair commercial use that conferred a period of
protection shorter than that specified in paragraph 1, that Party may retain
such system notwithstanding the obligations of paragraph 1."29 Although
apparently benefiting any Party, this exception will allow the United States
29 Id. at art. 15.10.1(a) n.15.
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to keep a period of three years, as provided for in its national law, for
products not involving new chemical entities, while imposing five years to
Central American countries.
2. Undisclosed Data
Legal creativity has reached surprising levels with the CAFTA. One
of the important limitations to the scope of Article 39.3 is that it only
applies to undisclosed information. As mentioned, the test data required for
approval are normally published; however, not surprisingly, a major
objective of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry has been to extend the
prohibition to use tests data even if publicly available. This objective has
been attained in a peculiar way.
According to Article 15.10.1 (d) "no Party may consider information
accessible within the public domain as undisclosed data" for the purposes
of this paragraph only, that is, in relation to the disclosure of data "where
necessary to protect the public. 3 ° But "if any undisclosed information
concerning safety and efficacy submitted to a Party, or an entity acting on
behalf of a Party, for purposes of obtaining marketing approval is disclosed
by such entity, the Party is still required to protect such information from
unfair commercial use in the manner set forth in this Article.' Instead of
clearly spelling the elements of a sui generis regime for disclosed and
undisclosed test data, the CAFTA has engendered a new legal fiction:
information freely available to the public (for instance published in the web
page of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration) is deemed "undisclosed."
B. Linkage
The United States has obtained another objective actively pursued by
its pharmaceutical industry: the CAFTA links drug registration to patent
status. There is no provision of this kind in the TRIPS Agreement. It was,
however, included, in other bilateral agreements negotiated by the United
States, such as the FTA with Chile. Article 15.10.2 of the CAFTA
provides:
Where a Party permits, as a condition of approving the marketing
of a pharmaceutical product, persons, other than the person
originally submitting safety or efficacy information, to rely on
evidence or information concerning the safety and efficacy of a
product that was previously approved, such as evidence of prior
marketing approval in the territory of a Party or in another country,
that Party:
3 Id. at art. 15.10.1(d).
31 id.
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(a) shall implement measures in its marketing approval process to
prevent such other persons from marketing a product covered by a
patent claiming the previously approved product or its approved
use during the term of that patent, unless by consent or
acquiescence of the patent owner; and
(b) shall provide that the patent owner shall be informed of the
request and the identity of any such other person who requests
approval to enter the market during the term of a patent identified
as claiming the approved product or its approved use.32
The patent-registration linkage ignores that patents are private rights,
as stated in the Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, and that, whether a
given product infringes or not, a patent is a legal matter entirely separate
from the technical issues concerning safety and efficacy of drugs. Health
authorities have no knowledge or experience whatsoever to assess the
claims of a patent. As discussed elsewhere,33 patents in pharmaceuticals
cover a wide range of subject matter, and can be used (or abused) to deter
generic competition.34 New chemical entities-the development of which
shows a declining trend since the 1990's-account for a small fraction 35 of
the thousands of patents obtained every year around known drugs,
including those in the public domain. Patents in this field cover,36 for
instance:
a) Pharmaceutical formulations; 37
b) Combinations of known products;38
c) Optical isomers;39
f) Active metabolites; 40
h) Salts of known substances;4'
32Id. at art. 15.10.2.
33 See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, TRENDS IN DRUG PATENTING (2001).
34 See Lara J. Glasgow , Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?. 41 IDEA 227, 234-235 (2001).
35 In 2002, for instance, only thirty "new chemical entities" were developed. See IMS
Health, New Product Focus (Dec. 2002).
36 See, e.g., Attila Mindi, Protection and Challenge of Pharmaceutical Patents, 1 J.
Generic Med. 1 (2003).
3' That is, a particular form given to an active ingredient for administration to the patient,
for instance, micronized particles.
38 They often consist of the simple mixture of known drugs (e.g. aspirin, carisoprodol, and
codeine phosphate).
39 Many chemical compounds present a molecular structure comprising two mirror forms.
Frequently, after the mixture ("racemic" mixture) of both forms has been patented, an
application is made for a patent for the most active isomer.
40 For example, after terfenadine had been on sale for several years, a patent was obtained
for the relevant active metabolite.
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i) Variants of known manufacturing processes;42
j) Polymorphs.43
All these types of patents refer to a product.44 Unfortunately, there is
no wording in the CAFTA indicating that the linkage would only operate
when the second applicant intends to commercialize the product as
patented, or that the linkage only applies with regard to patents claiming an
active ingredient,45 but a limitation of this type may be established in the
implementing national legislation. Should, under the vague formulation of
the CAFTA ("a patent claiming the product"), marketing approval be
denied if there were, for instance, a patent over a particular salt of a drug
that is in the public domain? If so, the linkage would widely and unduly
exclude generic competition until all patents around a product expire.
The patent-registration linkage goes beyond the standards applied in
developed countries. In Europe, for instance, there is complete
independence between intellectual property protection and registration.
Health authorities have no legal capacity to look into IPRs issues and deny
approval to an application that conforms to the relevant technical standards,
even if there were an infringement of IPRs. This is simply not their
business. In the United States,46 the Food and Drug Administration must
inform patent owners who registered patents in the so called "Orange
Book" about the existence of a third party's application on the same drug,
but it is the patent owner who needs to act before the courts if he wants to
interfere with the application procedures of a non licensed third party.
The linkage system is clearly a TRIPS-plus obligation. It creates a
new exclusive right (the right to prevent marketing approval of a
pharmaceutical product) non-existent under Article 28 of the TRIPS
41 For example, hydrates, anhydrates and solvates of the same drug.
42 For example, processes that shorten the number of steps necessary to obtain a product.
43 Polymorphs are different forms of crystallization of the same drug, see, e.g.,
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1016-1017 (N.D. Ill.
2003) affd 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
44 CAFTA also seems to oblige Central American countries to grant use patents, an
obligation absent in the TRIPS Agreement. See the reference to "approved use" in the Free
Trade Agreement, supra note 16, art. 15.10.3(a).
45 See, e.g., "Decreto por el que se reforma el Reglamento de Insumos para la Salud y el
Reglamento de la Ley de la Propiedad Industrial" [Decree reforming the Regulation of the
Health Supplies and the Regulation of the Law of Industrial Property], Diario Oficial de la
Federacion, 19 de septiembre de 2003, 106-107, available at
http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/dof/2003/septiembre/dof_ 19-09-2003.pdf (limiting the
linkage to patents on "la sustancia o ingrediente activo" [the active substance or ingredient],
thereby narrowing down the linkage's restriction on competition).
46 See generally, U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO
PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STuDY (July 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
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Agreement and national patent laws. It also creates a presumption of
validity of pharmaceutical product patents which health authorities are
neither empowered nor have the capacity to challenge. In numerous cases,
however, patents-often deliberately acquired to block genuine
competition-are invalidated by administrative authorities or courts.47 The
United States Federal Trade Commission has held in a recent report that,
the circumstances under which a patent is granted "suggest that an overly
strong presumption of a patent's validity is inappropriate" and that it "does
not seem sensible to treat an issued patent as though it had met some higher
standard of patentability. ' 48 This is why courts in the United States and
Europe take a very cautious approach towards the granting of injunctions in
patent cases.49
IV. Implications
There is a clear contradiction between the protectionism of the
pharmaceutical industry's interests enshrined in the CAFTA and the
international efforts made to ensure the availability of drugs, including in
countries without capacity for manufacturing pharmaceuticals. The
concerns raised about the implications of the TRIPS Agreement on public
health were reflected in the adoption, upon the initiative of developing
countries, of the "Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health," 50 at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference (November 9-14,
2001). The Doha Declaration recognized the "gravity" of the public health
problems afflicting many developing and least developed countries
("LDCs"), especially-but not limited to-those resulting from HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics, and recognized that the TRIPS
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner
supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.5'
47 Id.
4 8 U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8, 10 (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l0/innovationrpt.pdf.
49 See, e.g., Joseph Strauss, Reversal of the Burden of Proof the Principle of "Fair and
Equitable Procedures" and Preliminary Injunctions Under the TRIPS Agreement, 3 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 807, 822 (2000); J. Reichman & M. Zinnani, Las medidas
precautorias en el derecho estadounidense: el justo balance entre las partes, 8
JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 15-21 (2002).
50 Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, supra note 7.
51 Id. at para. 4.
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The Declaration also instructed the Council for TRIPS to address a
delicate issue: how can Members lacking or with insufficient manufacturing
capacities make effective use of compulsory licensing. 52 Manufacturing
capacities in pharmaceuticals are distributed very unevenly in the world.
Not many countries have the capacity to produce both active ingredients
and formulations, and very few countries maintain significant research and
development capabilities.
A controversial agreement to implement paragraph 6 was reached by
the WTO General Council, after a significant diplomatic battle, on August
30, 2003. 53 The agreed "solution" is based on a compromise developed by
the Chair of the TRIPS Council 54 and on a "Statement by the Chair"
proposed by the United States as a condition to accept the deal. Though
subject to cumbersome conditions-intended to protect the large
pharmaceutical companies-the Decision provides a mechanism for the
export/import of patented pharmaceutical products under compulsory
licenses.
The implications for public health of the CAFTA provisions are
significant. "Data exclusivity" does not provide exclusionary rights like a
patent, but creates an effective barrier to generics competition. Even where
a product were off-patent, no marketing approval can be granted to a
generic manufacturer unless (a) he develops the full set of test data
necessary to obtain approval, or (b) the terms of data exclusivity have
expired. The first option is costly, time-consuming, and raises serious
economic and ethical concerns. Duplicating existing tests is not only a
social waste; it is also ethically questionable as it entails unnecessary
animal suffering and risks for humans. The second option has a high social
cost, as patients are deprived from access to affordable drugs.
The data exclusivity and the patent-registration linkage can make
illusory the granting of compulsory licenses and non-commercial
government use, as prospective compulsory licensees are unlikely to have
sufficient incentives to replicate test data, and governments cannot normally
wait until a new set of test data has been developed. The TRIPS-plus
provisions on pharmaceutical products contained in the CAFTA not only
contradict the spirit and express objective of the Doha Declaration, they are
likely to effectively prevent the use of the system established by the
Council's Decision, as generic companies will be unable to obtain
52 Id. at para. 6.
53 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Implementation of
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
IP/C/W/405 (Aug. 28, 2003).
54 See Statement of the Chairman of the Council for TRIPS, JOB(02)/217 (Dec. 16, 2002),
available at http://commerce.nic.in/wtotrips3.htm.
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marketing approval during the period of data exclusivity or the patent life,
without the authorization of the patent holder.5
V Conclusion
The United States seems to have strategically opted for bilateralism as
the main route to support U.S. industry in its relentless campaign to
increase the levels of IP protection worldwide. This bilateralism, of course,
operates in a context of deep asymmetries. It is quite obvious that there is
no Central American pharmaceutical industry able to benefit in any manner
from the protection that the United States is bound to confer in its territory
under Article 15.10 of the CAFTA, and that it is the Central American
people, particularly the poor, who will pay the costs created by this new
protectionist framework.
The CAFTA also raises questions about how bilateral the U.S.
bilateralism actually is. As mentioned, the absolute and automatic patent-
registration linkage seems to go beyond U.S. law. Also, Article 15.10 may
ban, in practice, the use of patented inventions for compulsory licensing
and governmental non-commercial purposes. By creating through bilateral
negotiations standards of protection higher than those applied domestically,
the powerful U.S. pharmaceutical industry may be able to force an
amendment of U.S. domestic law in ways simpler and less costly that
through lobbying in Congress.
However, it is still to be seen whether the United States will fully
implement these new standards. It has been active, for instance, in utilizing
compulsory licenses to remedy anti-competitive practices and non-
56Wolth
commercial government use. Would the government or courts accept that
the interests of a pharmaceutical company prevails over public interest if
the supply of a drug were needed in an emergency, like in an "anthrax"
55 Moreover, CAFTA (Article 15.9.5) recognizes a "Bolar provision" that seems to limit
the possibility of exporting pharmaceutical products, except for those complying with
marketing approval requirements in a foreign country. If this interpretation were correct and
this provision applied effectively in the United States, generics companies in the United
States (as well as those located in Central America) would be unable to export drugs under
the WTO decision.
56 See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory
Licenses: Options for Developing Countries, WORKING PAPER (South Centre's Develop. and
Equity Series, Geneva, Switz.), 1999, available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications
/complicence/toc.htn; Jerome Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-voluntary Licensing of
Patented Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework Under TRIPS, and an
Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA, in UNCTAD-ICTSD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SERIES (2003), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd-series/iprs/CS-reichman-hasenzahl. pdf.
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case? 57 While Central American countries will likely be under significant
pressure to apply the new treaty rules, the United States may find ways to
soften or neutralize their impact. The incomplete implementation of the
Berne Convention with regard to moral rights, and the reluctance to amend
the copyright law despite the adverse decision in United States-Section
110(5) of the US Copyright Act,58 suggest that a great deal of resistance to
implement bilateral commitments inconsistent with current U.S. law may
arise.
Central American governments expect considerable commercial benefits
from the CAFTA's implementation in terms of access to the U.S. market.
Whether such benefits will materialize or not is uncertain. However, such
countries have accepted to severely limit generic competition in
pharmaceuticals through TRIPS-plus data exclusivity and patent-registration
linkage systems. These provisions will make it more difficult to ensure access
to drugs to all, and will deter the development of a competitive generic
industry in the region. In particular, Central American countries will be
prevented, in practice, from using the system for access to drugs established
by the WTO Decision of August 30th, 2003.
The CAFTA denies the right of developing countries to use to the fullest
extent possible the flexibilities allowed by the TRIPS Agreement to protect
public health. The serious public health problems identified by the "Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health" can only aggravate
in countries subject to TRIPS-plus (and even U.S.-law plus) standards like
those contained in the CAFTA and similar FTAs. A few U.S. pharmaceutical
companies will increase their benefits only marginally (given the small size of
the Central American pharmaceutical market), but a large number of people
may be deprived from medical treatment. What is a minor benefit for
pharmaceutical companies may be a major loss for poor countries. The world
can only become a more difficult place to live in if countries with a major
responsibility towards global welfare continue, in shaping intellectual property
rules, to give priority to narrow commercial interests rather than to improving
the lives of people and development prospects around the world.
57 See, e.g., South Centre, AIDS and Anthrax: Strange Bedfellows?, 38 S. LETTER 38, 38-
39 (2001), available at http://www.southcentre.org/southletter/sl38/sL38.pdf.
58 See WTO Panel Report on United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright
Act,WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) available at 2000 WL 816081.
[Vol. 36:79
